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Abstract
Many (proxy) automatic signature schemes are proposed to guard against the (unknown) virus
infection with the help of honest compiler makers. In these proposed schemes, the used compiler
agents’ public keys should be certificated and maintained by verifiers. If verifiers only keep the
compiler makers’ public key, it is more convenient. So an anonymous proxy automatic signature
scheme with compiler agents is proposed. In the new scheme, the compiler agents are anonymous and
verifiers do not need to store compiler agents’ public key. Moreover, verifiers can authenticate the
source of received executable problems and detect compiler agents’ deviation in advance. Our
schemes are suitable for adopting any discrete logarithm based signature schemes. Our scheme has
provides strong moderator’s judgment to detect of virus infection sources.
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1. Introduction
With the progress of network techniques, the Internet
is more and more popular in our real life. By utilizing the
convenience of the Internet, many services are realized
on the Internet. For examples, electronic mails, elec-
tronic voting, bulletin board system, and world-wide-
web are some popular services. Through the services on
the Internet, Digital data can be exchanged and broad-
casted over Internet.
Recently, because of unreliable environment of In-
ternet, computer viruses have become a serious problem.
Computer viruses can spread everywhere through In-
ternet, and cause big damage to users’ computer systems.
The virus infection can be detected by checking the in-
tegrity of executable programs. In order to guarantee the
integrity of executable programs, digital signature sc-
hemes are adopted. Any modification of signed original
files is easily detected by checking the corresponding
signatures. The virus detection by using signatures [1] is
better than the detection by using anti-virus software,
because anti-virus software cannot detect the infection
caused by unknown virus [24].
Usuda et al. first proposed an automatic signature
scheme to detect (unknown) computer viruses [5]. In
their automatic signature scheme, the viruses can be de-
tected in advance with the help of an honest compiler
maker. In their scheme, the infection source can be found
out. The compiler maker manages the compiling process
and the automatic signature generation. Later, Lin and
Jan [6] proposed an automatic signature scheme using a
compiler in distributed system. The client-server model
is more efficient, such that the compiler maker’s load can
be shared by distributed servers. Unfortunately, Tseng
[7] pointed out that Lin and Jan’s scheme is insecure
against forgery attacks. Moreover, source programs have
the length restriction. To remove these flaws, Hwang and
Li [8] proposed their proxy automatic signature scheme
based on the concept of proxy signature schemes. The
proxy agreement between servers and compiler makers
are guaranteed by two signatures in their scheme. But us-
ing two signatures between a compiler maker and a
Tamkang Journal of Science and Engineering, Vol. 10, No 1, pp. 7788 (2007) 77
*Corresponding author. E-mail: sjhwang@mail.tku.edu.tw
server is inefficient. Moreover, only the compiler maker
can validate the agreement of the server in their scheme.
It is unfair for the server. To remove this inconvenience
and unfairness, Hwang and Chen [9] proposed a new
proxy automatic signature scheme. But, in Hwang and
Chen’s scheme, one flaw is that the customer cannot val-
idate the real source of the executable program in ad-
vance. A customer may receive an executable program
that is no written by legal requesters. Furthermore, the
server’s public key must be obtained and certificated to
validate (proxy) automatic signatures. Since servers’
public keys may be revoked or the authorized servers
may be changed, it is inconvenient for verifiers to main-
tain the used authorized server’s public keys.
To remove this flaw and inconvenience, an anony-
mous proxy automatic signature scheme with compiler
agents is proposed to detect (unknown) virus. In the next
section, the basic assumptions and models for the new
scheme is described first. The same section also gives the
security goals of an anonymous proxy automatic signa-
ture scheme with compiler agents. Because our scheme
adopts Hwang and Chan’s anonymous proxy signature
scheme [10], their scheme is reviewed in Section 3. The
new scheme and the corresponding security analysis are
given in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 is the
performance analysis of the new scheme. The compari-
son among Lin-Jan’s scheme, Hwang and Li’s scheme,
Hwang and Chen’s scheme, and the new scheme are
stated in Section 7. The last section is our conclusions.
2. Basic Assumptions and Models
The assumptions and models in our anonymous pro-
xy automatic signature scheme are first mentioned. Then
the security goals of our scheme are given.
The assumptions can be classified into the assump-
tions about computer viruses, the ones about compiler
makers, and the ones about security.
Assumptions about computer viruses
 Viruses infect executable files but not text files.
 Viruses damage both executable and text files.
Assumptions about compiler makers
They honestly create compilers by finishing the fol-
lowing work.
 Create the system library, macro library, I/O li-
brary and include files.
 Sign all library files following every subroutine,
procedure, and initial structure.
 Calculate the fingerprints of the included files with
a one-way hash function and create the database of
the fingerprints.
 Create a compiler including both a preprocessor
and a linker for machine dependence and inde-
pendence.
Assumptions about security
The following states three security assumptions of
our scheme.
 The discrete logarithm program is the computa-
tional hard program.
 One-way hash functions are strong against finding
the collisions.
 Underlying discrete logarithm based signature sc-
hemes are secure.
 The distributed systems must properly execute the
verification program.
Client-server model
In order to distribute the compiling load of the com-
piler maker, our scheme adopts client-server model. In
our scheme, there are six kinds of participates: compiler
makers, servers, requesters, a trusted moderator, custom-
ers, and a trusted third party.
Compiler maker uM
Compiler maker honestly creates compilers and is
able to authorize an anonymous server to use his/her
compiler to share compiling load.
Server uS
A server first obtains the (anonymous) compiling
proxy authorization from compiler makers. Then the (an-
onymous) server helps requesters compile source pro-
grams to generate executable programs and correspond-
ing (anonymous) proxy automatic signatures.
Requester uR
A requester writes and sends source programs to the
server to compile source programs into executable pro-
grams. A requester then broadcasts his/her executable
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programs to customers.
Customer uC
A customer gets an executable program and corre-
sponding signatures from a requester. Then the customer
detects whether or not the executable program is infected
viruses with the help of the corresponding (anonymous)
proxy automatic signatures.
Trusted moderators
When customers find that some executable program
is infected with viruses, he/she needs the moderator’s
help to detect the infection source. If the infection source
is some anonymous server, the trusted moderator can
identify the server with the aid of compiler makers. If the
infection source is the requester, the moderator can also
prove this accusation. The moderator can also filter out
the groundless accusation from customers.
Trusted third party
The trusted third party (TTP for short) certificates
the public keys of all participates.
Figure 1 illustrates the client-server model and the
relations among participates in our scheme. In Figure 1,
the compiler maker honestly creates compilers, which
also automatically generates signatures on its generated
executable programs. The compiler maker may need
many anonymous servers to share the compiling load, so
the compiler maker authorizes these servers as its anony-
mous proxy agents by issuing anonymous proxy certifi-
cates. Each anonymous server accepts the compiling re-
quest and source programs from a requester. For the
source programs, the authorized compiler being execu-
ted on the server generates the executable program and
the corresponding anonymous proxy automatic signature
at the same time. The server sends the executable pro-
gram and proxy automatic signature to the requester. The
requester first validates the anonymous proxy certifica-
tes to check the server’s anonymous authorization. Then
the requester checks the correctness of proxy automatic
signatures to confirm the integrity of the executable pro-
grams. The requester also generates his/her signature on
the executable programs and anonymous proxy automa-
tic signatures. Then the requester sends his/her execut-
able programs, anonymous proxy automatic signatures,
and the requester’s signatures to customer. Using anony-
mous proxy automatic signatures of executable programs,
the customer checks the virus infection of executable
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Figure 1. Client-server model in distributed systems.
programs. Customers use the requester’s signatures to
confirm the broadcasting source of the received execut-
able programs. When virus infection is found, a modera-
tor detects the infection source. In our scheme, all public
keys of participates must be certificated by a trust third
party.
Security goals in our scheme
The security goals for our scheme are divided into
two classes. One class consists of the security goals about
an anonymous proxy automatic signature schemes. An-
other class consists of the security goals about the virus
detection and virus source identification. The security
goals about an anonymous proxy automatic signature sc-
hemes are given below.
 Anonymity: Besides the compiler maker, anyone
cannot find the server’s identity from anonymous
proxy automatic signatures or proxy certificates.
 Unforgeability: Only the authorized servers can
generate valid anonymous proxy automatic signa-
tures. Anyone cannot forge anonymous proxy au-
tomatic signatures even if he/she is a compiler
maker.
 Verifiability: Anyone can verify anonymous pro-
xy automatic signatures that a valid server gener-
ated by using the server’s proxy secret key.
 Identifiability: The server’s anonymity can be re-
voked by the compiler maker when disputes occur.
 Undeniability: The server cannot deny his/her gen-
eration of anonymous proxy automatic signature.
The compiler maker cannot deny the proxy autho-
rization (or the generation of the proxy certificate)
to the server.
 Distinguishability: Signatures of the compiler ma-
ker, servers, requesters and proxy automatic signa-
ture signatures can be distinguished in polynomial
time.
 Server’s protection: Beside the server itself, no one
can impersonate the server to compile the source
program and forge server’s proxy automatic signa-
tures.
The security goals about the virus detection and virus
source identification are given below.
 Server’s deviation: A server cannot falsely incrim-
inate any requester to write source programs with
viruses.
 Requester’s protection: No one can impersonate
the requester to distribute executable programs.
The requester can promise which source codes are
written by himself/herself. On the other hand, no
one can success to falsely incriminate the requester
writes a source code but he/she dose not.
 Executable program’s integrity: To guard against
the virus infection, no one can modify the content
of executable programs. Then anyone can verify
the integrity of executable programs.
 Source program’s secrecy: Besides the requester
and the server who compiling the requester’s so-
urce code, no one can find the source code from the
executable programs and anonymous proxy auto-
matic signatures.
 Requester’s deviation: A requester cannot falsely
incriminate any server to generate any executable
program containing viruses.
3. Review of Anonymous Proxy Signature
Scheme with Undeniable Agents
In Hwang and Chan’s scheme [10], there are four
participates in the anonymous proxy signature scheme:
the original signer O, the proxy signer P, the verifier V,
and the trusted third party TTP. In their scheme, there are
four algorithms: AuthAPDW (O, P, MW, b, proxy certifi-
cate), VerAuthAPDW (O, P, b, proxy certificate), Ver-
CertAPDW (O, proxy certificate), and IDAPDW (TTP, O, yP,
MW, b, proxy certificate). By using these four algorithms,
Hwang and Chan’s scheme is realized.
An original signer O executes the algorithm AuthAPDW
(O, P, MW, b, proxy certificate) to generate the proxy cer-
tificate on the proxy warrant MW and the proxy public
key Y to authorize an anonymous proxy signer P. Then
the authorized secret value b is securely transmitted to
the proxy singer P. Then the proxy signer P executes the
algorithm VerAuthAPDW (UO, UP, b, proxy certificate) to
validate the proxy certificate and the received authorized
secret value b. Anyone validates the proxy certificate
and the proxy public key Y by the algorithm VerCertAPDW
(O, proxy certificate). When there are some disputes with
the proxy signer, the original signer O can execute
IDAPDW (TTP, O, yP, b, proxy certificate) to revoke the an-
onymity of some proxy signer P, where yP is the certifi-
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cated public key of the proxy signer P.
Hwang and Chan’s realization of anonymous proxy
delegation scheme by warrant is described below. The
following are some public system-wide parameters and
functions in their scheme. The parameters p and q are
two large prime numbers and p = 2q + 1. The parameter g
is an element in Z p
* with order q. A public function h() is
a public cryptographic hash function. Each user U has a
secret key xUZq
*, and a certificated public key yU = g
xU
mod p. The proxy warrant MW specifies the identity of
the original signer O, the certificated public key yO of the
original signer O, the delegation period, and the other
necessary proxy details. The four algorithms are de-
scribed, respectively.
AuthAPDW(O, P, MW, b, proxy certificate)
The original signer O randomly selects a secret inte-
ger bZq
* and computes gb mod p. Then O computes the
proxy public key Y = yP  (g
b) mod p. The original signer
O uses his/her secret key xO to generate the signature (r,
s) on the digest h(MW, Y, h(bg
b mod p)) by adopting a
discrete-logarithm-based signature scheme. Then proxy
certificate is (MW, Y, h(bg
b mod p), (r, s)). Then the origi-
nal signer O sends proxy certificate and the secret value b
to the proxy signer O through a secure channel.
Suppose that the proxy signer received proxy certifi-
cate and the secret value b, then the proxy signer exe-
cutes the following algorithm to validate b and proxy
certificate.
VerAuthAPDW(O, P, b, proxy certificate)
The proxy signer P first computes the proxy public
key Y = yP  (g
b) mod p, and h = h(bgb mod p). Then
the proxy signer checks whether or not h(MW, Y, h(bg
b
mod p)) = h(MW, Y, h(bg
b mod p)) and the correctness
of proxy certificate by VerCertAPDW(O, proxy certifica-
te). If VerCertAPDW(O, proxy certificate) returns true,
proxy signer P computes the proxy secret key X = xP + b
and return true.
VerCertAPDW(O, proxy certificate)
A verifier computes H = h(MW, Y, h(bg
b mod p)).
The verifier validates the correctness of proxy certificate
by adopting the certificated public key yO and the corre-
sponding discrete-logarithm-based verification and H. If
(r, s) is correct, then VerCertAPDW(O, proxy certificate)
returns true and that the proxy certificate is validated.
IDAPDW(TTP, O, yP, b, proxy certificate)
The TTP validates proxy certificate by VerCertAPDW
(O, proxy certificate) to confirm that the proxy public
key Y is certificated by the original signer O. TTP com-
putes gb mod p and Y = gb  yP mod p. Then TTP checks
whether or not h(bgb mod p) = h(bgb mod p) and Y = Y.
If h(bgb mod p) = h(bgb mod p) and Y = Y hold, TTP
confirms that the proxy secret key X for the proxy public
key Y is only known by the one knowing xP.
Hwang and Chan’s scheme consists of the following
phases.
System Set-up phase
The public system parameters and functions are the
same as above. The public key and secret key of some
user Ui with identity IDi are xi and yi = g
xi mod p, respec-
tively. The notation MW also denotes the proxy warrant.
Proxy authorization phase
The original signer O executes AuthAPDW(O, P, MW,
b, proxy certificate) to authorize the proxy signer P on
behalf of the original signer O in anonymous way. Then
the proxy signer P obtains the proxy certificate and the
secret value b form the original signer O in secure man-
ners. Then the proxy signer P validates the correctness of
the proxy certificate, and the secret value b by adopting
the algorithm VerAuthAPDW(O, P, b, proxy certificate). If
VerAuthAPDW(O, P, b, proxy certificate) returns true, the
proxy signer UP accepts the proxy authorization and
owns a valid proxy certificate (MW, Y, h(b  g
b mod p), (r,
s)). Then the proxy secret key and proxy public key are X
= xP + b mod q and Y = g
X mod p = yP  (g
b) mod p, re-
spectively.
Proxy signature generation and verification phase
First of all, the proxy signer P uses the proxy secret
key X to generate the anonymous proxy signature (R, S)
on the message m by using any secure discrete-loga-
rithm-based signature generation algorithm. Then the
anonymous proxy signature (R, S) along with proxy cer-
tificate is sent to the verifier. After receiving m, (R, S)
and proxy certificate, the verifier executes VerCertAPDW
(O, proxy certificate) to check whether or not proxy cer-
tificate and the proxy public key Y are really authorized
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by the original signer O. Using the proxy public key Y
and the signature verification, the verifier validates the
correctness of the anonymous proxy signature (R, S) on
m. Finally, the verifier validates the anonymous proxy
signature (R, S) on the message m and the proxy certifi-
cate authorized by the original signer O.
Proxy signer identification phase
If the anonymous proxy signature (R, S) along with
the proxy certificate (MW, Y, h(bg
b mod p), (r, s)) has any
disputes, the original signer O must run the algorithm
IDAPDW(TTP, O, yP, b, proxy certificate) to convince
TTP that the proxy secret key X is only known by some-
one who has the secret key xP. Only the singer P knowing
the secret key xP can generate anonymous proxy signa-
ture (R, S) by using the proxy secret key X for X = b + xP
mod q. After adopting the proxy public key Y to validate
the disputed anonymous proxy signature (R, S), TTP is
convinced that the proxy signer P generates the disputed
anonymous proxy signature (R, S). Otherwise, TTP does
not be convinced.
The anonymous proxy signature scheme satisfies the
following properties.
(1) Unforgeability: Proxy signatures can be generated
only by authorized proxy signers. All unauthorized
users cannot forge proxy signatures even though
the original signer is included in them.
(2) Verifiability: Anyone can validate proxy signa-
tures generated by an authorized proxy signer.
(3) Proxy signer’s deviation: Each proxy signer can-
not obtain the secret key of the original signer or
other proxy signers. Moreover, any proxy signer
cannot forge signatures of the original signer, or
other proxy signers.
(4) Distinguishability: Proxy signatures, original sign-
ers’ signatures and proxy signers’ signatures can
be distinguished in polynomial time.
(5) Identifiability: Only the original signer can deter-
mine or prove the identities of all proxy signers.
(6) Proxy protection: The original signer cannot ob-
tain the proxy secret key of the proxy signer. When
original signers illegally authorize themselves to
be the anonymous proxy group, they are able to
generate some illegal proxy signatures. But origi-
nal signers cannot falsely incriminate any proxy
signer who ever generated these proxy signatures.
(7) Undeniability: The proxy signer cannot deny the
proxy signature generation. Moreover, the original
signer cannot deny the generation of the proxy cer-
tificates generated by him/her
(8) Strong anonymity: Verifiers cannot directly dis-
covery the identity of the proxy signer. Moreover,
each proxy signer cannot know or discover the
identity of any other proxy signer.
(9) Original signer’s deviation: The original signer
cannot obtain the secret key of any proxy signer.
The original signer cannot forge the signatures of
any proxy signer.
4. Our Realization of Anonymous Proxy
Automatic Signature Schemes with Compiler
Agents for (Unknown) Virus Detection
Our scheme contains these phases: Compiler-maker
authorization phase, server-requester execution phase,
customer verification phase, and moderator judgment
phase.
The following are some public system-wide parame-
ters and functions. The parameters p and q are two large
prime numbers and p = 2q + 1. The parameter g is an ele-
ment in Z p
* with order q. A public function h() is a public
cryptographic hash function. Each one Ui has a secret
key xiZq
*, and a certificated public key yi = g
xi mod p.
The proxy warrant MW specifies the identity of the com-
piler maker uM, the certificated public key yM of the com-
piler maker uM, the delegation period, and the other nec-
essary proxy details.
Compiler-maker authorization phase
The server uS sends the compiler maker uM the com-
piler agent request RSM for the compiling authorization.
After validating the request RSM, the compiler maker uM
gives the server an authorized compiler and the proxy
certificate. Then the compiler maker authorizes the
server as his/her compiler agents.
Step 1.
The server uS generates the signature (rSM, sSM) on
the digest h(uS||RSM) by any discrete logarithm based sig-
nature scheme [11,12] and sends (RSM, uS, (rSM, sSM)) to
the compiler maker, where RSM denotes the compiler
agent request. Here and after, any signatures are gener-
ated and validated by adopting any discrete logarithm
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based signature scheme. It is better to select the same dis-
crete logarithm based signature schemes.
Step 2.
After receiving (RSM, uS, (rSM, sSM)), the compiler
maker uM performs the following steps:
(1) Select a secret random number bZq
*.
(2) Compute h.
(3) Use the secret key xM to generate the signature
(rMS, sMS) on h(MW, h(CR), Y, h(bg
b mod p)).
(4) Send the server uS the proxy certificate (MW,
h(CR), Y, h(bg
b mod p), (rMS, sMS)), the compiler
CR, and the secret value b through a secure channel.
Step 3.
After receiving the proxy certificate (MW, h(CR), Y,
h(bgb mod p), (rMS, sMS)), the compiler CR, and secret
value b from compiler maker, the server uS validates
them by executing the following steps.
(1) Compute Y = yS  g
b mod p.
(2) Validate the secure value b by checking h(bgb
mod p) = h(bgb mod p).
(3) Check the correctness of the proxy certificate (MW,
h(CR), Y, h(bg
b mod p), (rMS, sMS)) by validating
the signature (rMS, sMS) on the message (MW,
h(CR), Y, h(bg
b mod p)) with the compiler maker
uMs public key yM.
If the proxy certificate (MW, h(CR), Y, h(bg
b mod p),
(rMS, sMS)) is correct, then the proxy secret key is X = xS +
b mod q and the proxy public key is Y = gX mod p.
Server-requester execution phase
Suppose that a requester writes a source program and
wants to compile it with an anonymous server’s aid.
Step 1.
The requester validates the proxy certificate (MW,
h(CR), Y, h(bg
b mod p), (rMS, sMS)) by verifying the signa-
ture (rMS, sMS) on the message (MW, h(CR), Y, h(bg
b mod
p)). If the proxy certificate is not correct, the requester
stops.
Step 2.
The requester generates the signature (rRS, sRS) on
h(P, (uR||RRS)) and sends (P, (uR||RRS), (rRS, sRS)) to the
server, where RRS denotes the compiling request of the
requester.
Step 3.
After receiving (P, (uR||RRS), (rRS, sRS)), the server
validates the signature (rRS, sRS). If the signature is cor-
rect, the server accepts requester and prepares to compile
the requester’s source program; otherwise the server re-
fuses the requester.
Step 4.
The server checks the correctness of the compiler
CR by verifying the proxy certificate (MW, h(CR), Y,
h(bgb mod p)) and h(CR) = h(CR).
Step 5.
If the above tests pass, the server compiles the source
program P by CR to generate the executable program E.
The compiler CR not only generates E but also uninter-
ruptedly adopts the proxy secret key X and discrete loga-
rithm based signature scheme to generate the proxy auto-
matic signature (rSR, sSR) on h(uR, E, h(CR), h(P), (rMS,
sMS)). Then the server sends (uR, E, (rSR, sSR)) to the re-
quester.
Step 6.
After receiving (uR, E, (rSR, sSR)), the requester che-
cks the signature (rSR, sSR) on h(uR, E, h(CR), h(P), (rMS,
sMS)). If the signature is correct, the requester begins to
publish his/her program to customers.
Step 7.
The requester generates the signature (rRC, sRC) on
h((rSR, sSR), E, h(CR), h(P)).
Step 8.
The requester sends the proxy certificate (MW, h(CR),
Y, h(bgb mod p), (rMS, sMS)) and ((rSR, sSR), (rRC, sRC), uR,
E, h(P)) to the customer. The signature (rRC, sRC) can
guarantee the real source of the executable program E.
Customer verification phase
Before the customer executes the program E, the
software may be infected with some viruses. The cus-
tomer has to check the corresponding signature of the ex-
ecutable program. At the first time, the customer per-
forms the following verifications.
Step 1.
Check the signature (rRC, sRC) on h((rSR, sSR), E,
h(CR), h(P)) by using the requester uR’s public key yR.
Step 2.
Verify the proxy certificate (MW, h(CR), Y, h(bg
b mod
p), (rMS, sMS)) by using the compiler maker uM’s public
key yM.
Step 3.
Use the proxy public key Y to verify the proxy auto-
matic signature (rSR, sSR) on h(uR, E, h(CR), h(P), (rMS, sMS)).
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If anyone of the above verifications is failure, the
customer refuses the execution of E. Otherwise, the exe-
cutable program E is safe from viruses, and the customer
can executes it. Later on, the customer just needs to ver-
ify the proxy automatic signature (rSR, sSR) on h(uR, E,
h(CR), h(P), (rMS, sMS)) for detecting virus infection.
Moderator judgment phase
After receiving the software published by a reque-
ster, the customer verifies the corresponding signature. If
the verification is not correct, the executable program
may be infected by viruses. So the customer sends some
information to the moderator, and then the moderator can
find out the source of the viruses. Moreover, if the source
of the viruses is the server, the moderator has to revoke
the anonymity of the server.
Step 1.
The customer sends the following data to the moder-
ator.
(1) Proxy certificate (MW, h(CR), Y, h(bg
b mod p),
(rMS, sMS)),
(2) Anonymous proxy automatic signature (rSR, sSR)
on h(uR, E, h(CR), h(P), (rMS, sMS)), and
(3) uR, E and h(P).
Step 2.
The moderator checks the proxy certificate (MW,
h(CR), Y, h(bg
b mod p), (rMS, sMS)) by using the signature
(rMS, sMS) on the digest h(MW, h(CR), Y, h(bg
b mod p))
and the compiler-maker’s public key yM. The moderator
also checks the correctness of (rSR, sSR) on the digest
h(uR, E, h(CR), h(P), (rMS, sMS)) by using the proxy public
key Y. If both (rMS, sMS) and (rSR, sSR) are correct, the
moderator continues this process; otherwise, the moder-
ator rejects the customer’s request for the requester or the
server is framed by the customer.
Step 3.
The moderator obtains the source program P and the
signature (rRS, sRS) from the server. The moderator vali-
dates the signature (rRS, sRS) by using the requester’s pub-
lic key. If the signature (rRS, sRS) is correct, the received
source program P is indeed written by the requester;
otherwise the moderator runs the identification process
IDAPDW(TTP, uM, yS, b, proxy certificate) to revoke the
anonymity of anonymous servers.
Step 4.
The moderator gets the original authorized compiler
CR from the compiler-maker.
Step 5.
The moderator applies CR on the source program P
to generate E.
Step 6.
The moderator validates whether or not h(P)  h(P),
h(CR)  h(CR), and h(E)  h(E). If anyone of h(P) 
h(P), h(CR)  h(CR), and h(E)  h(E) occurs, the moder-
ator runs the identification process IDAPDW(TTP, uM, yS,
b, proxy certificate) to revoke the anonymity of anony-
mous servers.
Step 7.
If h(P) = h(P), the moderator checks P line by line to
find out whether or not the requester writes a program
with viruses.
5. Security Analysis
The security of our scheme is based on the underly-
ing discrete logarithm signature scheme and Hwang and
Chan’s anonymous proxy signature scheme [10]. By
adopting secure discrete logarithm signature schemes,
all the secret key of each user and secret random numbers
are secure in our scheme. Moreover, the signatures used
in our scheme cannot be forged and repudiated. In
Hwang and Chan’s scheme [10], the anonymity of proxy
singers is guaranteed by the security of the secret value b.
Fortunately, the secret value b is protected by the discrete
logarithm problem and one-way function. In Hwang and
Chan’s scheme [10], the unforgeability of proxy signa-
tures is based on the fact that the proxy secret key is only
known by the proxy singer. Since the proxy secret key is
the sum of the secret value b and the proxy signer’s secret
key, only the authorized proxy singer knows the proxy
secret key.
Some security considerations for our scheme are li-
sted below.
(1) Anonymity: Since our scheme adopts Hwang and
Chan’s anonymous proxy signature scheme, the
distributed servers’ identities cannot be detected
besides the compiler maker. The anonymity is gua-
ranteed by Hwang and Chan’s scheme.
(2) Unforgeability: The discrete logarithm signatures
and the proxy automatic signatures are both based
on the discrete logarithm problem, so all the signa-
tures are unforged.
84 Shin-Jia Hwang and Kuang-Hsi Chen
(3) Verifiability: In our scheme, all signatures can be
verified by the corresponding verification equa-
tion and signers’ public keys. Proxy automatic sig-
natures can also be verified by using the compiler-
maker’s public key because the underlying Hwang
and Chan’s anonymous proxy signature scheme
satisfies the verifiability property.
(4) Identifiability: The moderator can identify the an-
onymous servers with the aid of compiler maker.
Because the anonymity of severs can be revoked in
Hwang and Chan’s scheme, the moderator can find
out the real server that compiles the source pro-
gram in the moderator phase.
(5) Undeniability: The proxy automatic signature and
discrete logarithm based signature must be gener-
ated by the signer’s secret key. If the verification
of signatures is satisfied, the signer cannot deny
he/she generated the verified signatures.
(6) Distinguishability: The proxy automatic signatures,
the server’s original signatures, the compiler ma-
ker’s original signatures are generated by different
secret keys, respectively. These signatures have to
be validated with different public keys, respec-
tively. So these signatures can be distinguished for
the verification using different public keys.
(7) Server’s protection: A malicious user wants to
falsely incriminate the server that he/she compiles
a source program with virus and generate the cor-
responding proxy automatic signature. That is the
malicious user has to forge the proxy automatic
signatures or has the proxy secret key X of the
server. Fortunately the proxy secret key X = xS + b
mod q is known only by the server and proxy auto-
matic signatures are unforged. So the proxy auto-
matic signatures can be used to guarantee that the
executable program is generated by the server it-
self.
(8) Server’s deviation: In the moderator judgment
phase, the moderator can confirm the correct so-
urce of the source program and compiler. So the
server cannot falsely incriminate any requester
writing programs with virus.
(9) Requester’s protection: The requester sends ((rSR,
sSR), (uR, E, h(CR), h(P))), the signature (rRC, sRC)
on ((rSR, sSR), (E, h(CR), h(P))) and the proxy certif-
icate to the customer. The customer can confirm
that the program is distributed from some re-
quester by validating the signature (rRC, sRC). Be-
cause the signature (rRC, sRC) is not forgeable, no
one can falsely incriminate the requester writes
source codes but he/she does not.
(10) Executable program’s integrity: The integrity of
executable programs is protected by proxy auto-
matic signatures. Anyone can verify the proxy au-
tomatic signature by using the proxy public key Y
to detect modification of executable programs.
(11) Source program’s secrecy: Because h(P) is used to
generated signatures (rSR, sSR) and (rRC, sRC), signa-
tures (rSR, sSR) and (rRC, sRC) can be verified by only
using h(P) without releasing the content of the
source program P. Except the server and the re-
quester, no one knows the source program P of the
executable program E.
(12) Requester’s deviation: The integrity of executable
programs is guaranteed by the proxy automatic
signatures. Since proxy automatic signatures are
unforged, the requester cannot incriminate any ser-
ver to generate any executable program containing
viruses.
6. Performance Analysis and Discussion
The performance analysis of our scheme is stated be-
low. First, some notations are defined below.
Tmp: The computation cost for one modular multiplica-
tion modular p.
Tmq: The computation cost for one modular multiplica-
tion modular q.
Texp: The computation cost for one modular expon-
entiation modular p.
Thash:The computation cost for one-way hash functions.
Tinv: The computation cost for inverse operation modu-
lar q.
Tsig: The computation cost for the discrete logarithm
based signature generation, which includes one
Thash to generate the message digest.
Tver: The computation cost for the discrete logarithm
based signature verification, which includes one
Thash to generate the message digest.
Because the underlying signature scheme is not spe-
cified in our scheme, the signature generation cost Tsig
including one Thash and the signature verification cost
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Tver including one Thash denote the signature and verifica-
tion cost of the underlying signature scheme, respecti-
vely. Now the computational cost of our scheme is given
phase by phase.
Figure 2 shows the computational cost in the com-
piler-maker authorization phase. First, one Tsig is used to
generate the signature (rSM, sSM) on the proxy request
RSM from the server to the compiler maker and one Tver is
used to verify (rSM, sSM). After the verification of signa-
ture (rSM, sSM), the compiler maker computes (MW, h(CR),
Y, h(bgb mod p). This computation costs Texp + 2Tmp +
1Thash. Then the compiler maker needs one Tsig to gener-
ate the signature (rMS, sMS) on the digest of (MW, h(CR), Y,
h(bgb mod p). After receiving the proxy certificate (MW,
h(CR), Y, h(bg
b mod p), (rMS, sMS)), the secret value b, and
the compiler maker CR, the verification of the signature
(rMS, sMS) and the validation of (b, CR) cost the server one
Tver and Texp + 2Tmp + 2Thash, respectively.
Figure 3 shows the computational cost in the server-
requester execution phase. The first one Tver is used to
check the correctness of the proxy certificate (MW, h(CR),
Y, h(bgb mod p), (rMS, sMS)). Then the generation of the
signature (rRS, sRS) on the digest of (P, (uS||RRS)) costs the
requester one Tsig. After receiving (P, (uS||RRS), (rRS,
sRS)), the verification of the signature (rRS, sRS) costs one
Tver. If the verification of signature (rRS, sRS) is correct,
the server needs Tver + Thash to check the compiler CR by
verifying the proxy certificate (MW, h(CR), Y, h(bg
b mod
p)) and h(CR) = h(CR). Then one Tsig is used to generate
the proxy automatic signature. After receiving the proxy
automatic signature (rSR, sSR), the requester needs one
Tver to verify (rSR, sSR). If (rSR, sSR) is correct, the re-
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Figure 2. Computational cost in compiler-maker authorization phase.
Figure 3. Computational cost in server-requester execution phase.
quester needs one Tsig to generate the signature (rRC, sRC).
Figure 4 shows the computational cost in the customer
verification phase. The first time verification, the cus-
tomer totally needs 3Tver to verify signature (rRC, sRC), the
proxy certificate (MW, h(CR), Y, h(bg
b mod p), (rMS, sMS))
and the automatic signature (rSR, sSR). Later, the customer
only needs one Tver to verify the proxy automatic signature
(rSR, sSR) before executing the received program.
In the moderator phase, the verification of three sig-
natures (rMS, sMS), (rSR, sSR) and (rRS, sRS) costs 3Tver.
Then the moderator coasts 3Thash and one Tsig to generate
the proxy automatic signature on the CR, P, and E. If the
moderator finds out the source of infection is server, he/
she needs Texp + 2Tmp + Thash to revoke the anonymity of
the server. Therefore, the upper bound for the computa-
tional cost in the moderator phase is 2Texp + 4Tmp + 5Thash
+ 3Tver + Tsig.
Table 1 summarizes the computational cost of each
kind of participates in our scheme.
7. Comparison
There are many related signature schemes for virus
detection had been proposed previous. Table 2 gives the
comparison among our scheme, Hwang and Chen’s sc-
heme [9], Hwang and Li’s scheme [8], and Lin and Jan’s
scheme [6].
By adopting Hwang and Chan’s anonymous proxy
signature scheme, our new proxy automatic signature
scheme can provide servers anonymity while the other
three schemes do not. By the anonymous property, ve-
rifiers can store only compiler makers’ public keys to
verify proxy certificates. Then verifiers obtained certifi-
cated proxy public key to verify automatic signatures.
Because the other three schemes do not provide server
anonymity, public keys of servers should be also stored
and certificated. Moreover, because using the signature
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Figure 4. Computational cost in customer verification phase.
Table 2. Comparison among four automatic signature schemes
Our Scheme Hwang and Chen’s
Scheme
Hwang and Li’s
Scheme
Lin and Jan’s
Scheme
Anonymity    
Source confirmation of executable
programs in advance
   
Storage only for compiler maker’s
public key and proxy certificate
   
Pre-detection of servers’ deviation    
Suitability for any discrete logarithm
based signature schemes
   
Judgment capability    
No forgery attack    
No length restriction    
Client-server models    
Table 1. Computational cost of participates in our scheme
Participates Computational cost
Compiler-
maker
Texp+2Tmp+2Thash+Tver+Tsig
Server Texp+2Tmp+3Thash+3Tver+2Tsig
Requester 2Tver+2Tsig
Customer [1] 3Tver (First time) [2] Tver (Afterward)
Moderator 2Texp+4Tmp+5Thash+3Tver+Tsig (Upper bound)
(rRC, sRC), the server’s deviation can be detected in ad-
vance and the customer can confirm the source of the re-
ceiving program. In the other three schemes, the server’s
deviation and program sources cannot be detected and
confirmed in advance. Only our new scheme and Hwang
and Chen’s scheme do not specify underlying discrete
logarithm signature schemes while the other two sche-
mes do. Both our new scheme and Hwang and Chen’s
scheme have the advantage that any discrete logarithm
based signature scheme can be used. This advantage pro-
vides flexibility for the practical implementation. Fur-
thermore, only the first three schemes have the modera-
tor phase to exactly detect the source of infection except
Lin and Jan’s scheme. So only the first three schemes
have judgment capability. Among the four schemes, only
Lin and Jan’s scheme has length restriction on source
codes and is vulnerable under forgery attacks [7]. Ac-
cording to Table 2, our scheme provides more functions
and services than the other three schemes.
8. Conclusion
A new anonymous proxy automatic signature sc-
heme with compiler agents is proposed to detect infec-
tion of (unknown) virus. In the new scheme, customers
can always verify the proxy automatic signature by using
the proxy public key which is first validated by only the
compiler maker’s public key. Even if the authorization of
some server is terminated, customers still easily verifies
proxy automatic signatures because only the compiler
maker’s public key is necessary. The source of the exe-
cutable program can be validated by customers when
they received. Moreover, the new scheme provides ro-
bust infection detection of viruses. If some viruses exist,
the infection source can be exactly found out. Our sc-
heme has the properties about protection and deviation
for servers and requester mentioned in Section 2. Finally,
our scheme satisfies all the other security goals stated in
Section 2 for a virus detection system.
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